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ABSTRACT
I consider recent strategies proposed by econometricians for extrapolating
causal eﬀects from experimental to target populations. I argue that these
strategies fall prey to the extrapolator’s circle: they require so much
knowledge about the target population that the causal eﬀects to be
extrapolated can be identiﬁed from information about the target alone. I
then consider comparative process tracing (CPT) as a potential remedy.
Although speciﬁcally designed to evade the extrapolator’s circle, I argue
that CPT is unlikely to facilitate extrapolation in typical econometrics and
evidence-based policy applications. To argue this, I oﬀer a distinction
between two kinds of extrapolation, attributive and predictive, the latter
being prevalent in econometrics and evidence-based policy. I argue that
CPT is not helpful for predictive extrapolation when using the kinds of
evidence that econometricians and evidence-based policy researchers
prefer. I suggest that econometricians may need to consider qualitative
evidence to overcome this problem.
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1. Introduction
Evidence-Based Policy (EBP) is premised on the idea that policy eﬀects estimated in one population
can be used for predicting the eﬀects of similar, future interventions in distinct target populations.
The extrapolation of causal eﬀects to eventual targets, however, remains riddled with substantive
challenges. This is because populations often diﬀer in causally relevant respects, so assuming that
the eﬀect of an intervention will be the same in the target as in an experiment is typically not
justiﬁed – this would be extrapolation based on hope (cf. Cartwright, 2012; Steel, 2008).
In the non-structural econometrics literature, interactive covariate-based approaches have been
proposed to help overcome problems of extrapolation (Crump, Hotz, Imbens, & Mitnik, 2008; Hotz,
Imbens, & Mortimer, 2005; Muller, 2014, 2015). In a nutshell, these approaches consider causally rel-
evant diﬀerences between populations in the form of interactive covariates, i.e. variables that induce
diﬀerences in causal eﬀects between individuals and between populations. The aim is to take diﬀer-
ences in these variables into account by adjusting the expectation of the eﬀect in the target accord-
ing to how these variables are distributed there.
A key problem is that learning which variables to adjust for, and how these variables are involved
in producing the eﬀects of interest will often be exceedingly demanding, e.g. one might need to
know whether they play the same causal roles in both populations. This raises concerns about the
extrapolator’s circle (LaFollette & Shanks, 1996; Steel, 2008): the knowledge required about the
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target population may be so extensive that one could learn the eﬀect of interest based on infor-
mation about the target alone. This would make the act of extrapolating from an experimental popu-
lation redundant.
Not all is lost, as there are other strategies that could help underwrite extrapolation. Of particular
interest is Steel’s (2008) comparative process tracing strategy (CPT) that supposedly evades the extra-
polator’s circle. Although promising, I argue that CPT has trouble evading the extrapolator’s circle in
many cases of interest in EBP and econometrics. Speciﬁcally, I oﬀer a distinction between two kinds of
extrapolation, attributive and predictive, the latter being prevalent in EBP and econometrics. Attribu-
tive extrapolation aims to attribute observed eﬀects causally to their suspected causes. Here, both the
intervention of interest as well as its suspected eﬀects have been observed in the target. In contrast,
predictive extrapolation aims to predict the future eﬀects of yet unobserved interventions, so neither
the intervention nor its suspected eﬀects have been observed in the target at the time of extrapol-
ation. I argue that in predictive extrapolation the kind of evidence favored by econometricians, i.e.
quantitative observational1 data, cannot be used to tell whether populations are suﬃciently similar
to license extrapolation. I conclude that this provides a strong case for thinking that EBP researchers
and econometricians should consider alternative kinds of support for underwriting extrapolation,
including qualitative evidence.
Let me brieﬂy outline the general challenges involved in extrapolation and the distinctive chal-
lenge posed by the extrapolator’s circle.
2. Extrapolation: the basics
Following Steel (2008), two challengesmust bemet by any persuasive strategy for extrapolation. First, since
causally relevant diﬀerences between experimental and target populations will almost always obtain, a
persuasive strategy for extrapolation should tell us how extrapolation can proceed successfully despite
such diﬀerences. It is useful to distinguish between three levels at which such diﬀerences can obtain.
The ﬁrst concerns diﬀerences in the realizations/distributions of variables. For instance, a causal
eﬀect of X on Y may diﬀer between individuals/populations as a result of diﬀerences in the value/dis-
tribution of some moderating variable W that induces diﬀerences in the causal eﬀect. For instance,
when higher values ofW induce larger eﬀects for one and the same intervention, andW has a higher
mean in population B than in A, then the mean eﬀect of one and the same intervention on X will be
larger in B than in A.
The second level concerns diﬀerences in the parameters associated with the variables that ﬁgure in
the causal mechanisms governing the eﬀects of interest. For instance, X can be causally relevant for Y
in two populations, yet the particular way in which X is relevant for Y , e.g. the parameter capturing its
marginal eﬀect on Y , can diﬀer between populations. The same applies to the way in which moder-
ating variables aﬀects causal relationships between X and Y . For instance, for one and the same inter-
vention, higher values of W might induce larger eﬀects in A, but smaller eﬀects in B.
Finally, the third level at which causally relevant diﬀerences can obtain concerns the basic structure
of the mechanisms2 that govern the eﬀects of interest. For instance, X can be causally relevant for Y in
A but not in B, e.g. because there is no causal pathway connecting X and Y in B. More generally, diﬀer-
ences at the third level concern qualitative features of causal mechanisms; e.g. features of the skel-
etons of the causal graphs representing the mechanisms in both populations such as whether there is
some arrow between a pair of variables or not, what is the direction of the arrow, and what is the
functional form association between the variables.3
Successful extrapolation hinges on similarities and diﬀerences between populations at diﬀerent
levels; and if diﬀerences at any of these levels obtain, we will need to learn about them and take
them into account. This is not an easy task, however, as learning what the relevant similarities and
diﬀerences are can be extremely challenging.
Moreover, even if we could be successful in identifying them, there is a second challenge to be
addressed: the extrapolator’s circle (LaFollette & Shanks, 1996; Steel, 2008). Speciﬁcally, the knowledge
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about the target required for extrapolation must not be so extensive that we can identify the causal
eﬀect in the target based on information from the target alone.4 This would render the act of extra-
polating from the experiment redundant. For instance, suppose X causes Y in A and our aim is to
determine whether this also holds true in B. Suppose the mechanism in A is X→Z→Y. In order to
decide whether X causes Y in B it seems important to learn whether a similar mechanism is instan-
tiated there. However, learning that X→Z→Y in B makes the extrapolation from A redundant, as one
can already answer whether X causes Y in B from information about B alone. This poses a challenge
for any persuasive account of extrapolation: any such account should help us extrapolate given only
partial information about the target, i.e. information that does not, by itself, permit identiﬁcation of
the eﬀect of interest (Steel, 2008, p. 87).
With this background in place, let me expand on strategies for extrapolation oﬀered in the econo-
metrics literature and explain why they fall prey to the extrapolator’s circle.
3. Extrapolation in econometrics
Interactive covariate-based strategies for extrapolation oﬀered in the non-structural5 econometrics
literature (Hotz et al., 2005; Muller, 2014, 2015) acknowledge that there are likely to be important
diﬀerences between experimental and target populations. To overcome these obstacles, they
propose a way in which we can still successfully extrapolate by taking such diﬀerences into
account. In doing so, they focus on diﬀerences at the ﬁrst of the three levels outlined above: diﬀer-
ences in the distributions of interactive covariates, i.e. variablesW that can induce diﬀerences in causal
eﬀects between individuals and between populations.
Taking such diﬀerences into account is a two-step procedure: the ﬁrst step is to identify a causal
eﬀect in an experimental population as a conditional average treatment eﬀect (CATE, see Muller, 2014,
2015), i.e. an average treatment eﬀect that is estimated conditionally upon the experimental popu-
lations’ distribution of interactive covariates. This is supposed to capture how the average treatment
eﬀect in the experimental population hinges on that population’s speciﬁc distribution of interactive
covariates. The second step is to reweight CATE according to the observed distribution of interactive
covariates in the target.
For instance, suppose we learn that the causal eﬀect of reducing class sizes X on increasing
student performance Y depends on the level of teacher quality W ; the higher W , the larger the
eﬀect of X on Y . Suppose we want to extrapolate this eﬀect from A to B. Let us assume that the dis-
tribution ofW in A exhibits a high mean; teachers in A are of high quality. Facing potential diﬀerences
in W between populations, successful extrapolation requires that we take the distribution of W in B
into account. If, for instance,W is lower in B, then the eﬀect to be expected in Bwill be smaller. To help
us predict how much smaller, the CATE obtained in A is reweighted according to the observed dis-
tribution of teacher quality in B. The approach oﬀered by Hotz et al. (2005) hence aims to permit
quantitative extrapolation of causal eﬀects in the presence of causally relevant diﬀerences by
using suitably identiﬁed CATEs from an experiment and quantitative observational data on the distri-
butions of relevant interactive covariates in the target.
I will not expand here on the assumptions required for this strategy to proceed successfully; these
are laid out together with a proof of the relevant extrapolation theorem in Hotz et al. (2005) and
several general concerns about these assumptions are discussed by Muller (2014, 2015). My
concern here is diﬀerent, and more fundamental: interactive covariate-based approaches are only
concerned with the ﬁrst level at which causally relevant diﬀerences between populations can
obtain, i.e. diﬀerences in interactive covariate distributions. However, accounting for these diﬀer-
ences is only useful if there are no relevant diﬀerences between populations at other levels (this is
suggested, but not elaborated in Deaton & Cartwright, 2016, p. 39).
For instance, supplementary teaching S might be positively relevant for the eﬀect of schooling X
on student performance Y in an experimental population; it helps students review material discussed
in class. However, it might be negatively relevant in a target where students are stigmatized by their
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peers for being in need of supplementary teaching, making them less conﬁdent in their abilities and
decreasing their performance on tests.6 Clearly, adjusting for diﬀerences in S is only useful if we are
conﬁdent that populations do not diﬀer at any of the lower levels; speciﬁcally not with respect to
whether and how S is involved in producing the eﬀect of interest. Moreover, merely assuming that
populations are similar at lower levels would amount to extrapolation based on hope. Populations
frequently diﬀer in their structural makeup, e.g. because institutions, norms, individuals’ psychologi-
cal characteristics, and other features diﬀer between them. So we need to support empirically the
claim that populations are suﬃciently similar to warrant extrapolation. That is not only diﬃcult,
however, but even if feasible, raises concerns about the extrapolator’s circle.
Let me start at the most basic level to illustrate. To support the assumption that experimental and
target populations are similar with respect to the basic structure of causal mechanisms we need to
learn something about the mechanisms in both populations. Say, for instance, the mechanism in the
experimental population is understood to be X→Z→Y. Then, in order to ensure that the mechanism in
the target is similar, we might need to learn whether all causal relations comprising this mechanism
are present there as well, i.e. we need to learn that X→Z and that Z→Y. But learning this makes the
information obtained from the experimental population redundant to answering whether X is cau-
sally relevant for Y in the target.
Similar concerns apply when learning about similarities in parameters associated with variables
that ﬁgure in the mechanisms. While we might be able to learn how a variableW induces diﬀerences
in a causal eﬀect in an experimental population, this only gives us half the information we need. To
see this, let us assume that we are fortunate enough know the structural equations governing indi-
viduals’ outcomes. Let Y be the outcome, X the treatment variable, b the parameter that captures the
‘pure’ causal eﬀect of X , W an interactive covariate of the X−Y-eﬀect, g the parameter that captures
the marginal eﬀect of W on the causal eﬀect of X on Y , and v an idiosyncratic error capturing the
eﬀects of other variables on Y . For ease of illustration, let the outcome equations for individuals in
population A and B be of an additively separable form:7
YA ⇐ c + b∗XA + gA∗WA∗XA + vA
YB ⇐ c + b∗XB + gB∗WB∗XB + vB
It is easy to see that the marginal eﬀect on Y induced by a given change in X depends on b, g andW ,
since DY/DX = b+ g∗W . Now, even if b is the same between populations, adjusting for diﬀerences
in W can only proceed successfully if gB = gA, i.e. if the way in which W induces diﬀerences in the
eﬀect is the same in both populations. So even if we are fortunate enough to have learned gA, we
still need to learn gB in order to validate that gB = gA (or is otherwise suﬃciently similar).
Just like validating that mechanisms are similar between populations, establishing that they are
similar in population-level parameters is generally diﬃcult. For once, observational data for estimat-
ing gB might not be available. Even if they are, unbiased estimation of gB requires substantive assump-
tions, e.g. that there are no common causes of W and diﬀerences in treatment eﬀects that could
induce signiﬁcant, but ultimately spurious interactions between X andW . To avoid such assumptions,
gB can be identiﬁed by performing factorial experiments where both X and W are exogenously varied
(see e.g. Imai, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2013; Pearl, 2014). However, doing so may not only be diﬃcult –
think of variables such as age that cannot be meaningfully intervened on – but also, factorial exper-
iments in the target involve intervention on X and hence trivially fall prey to the extrapolator’s circle
as we can learn the causal eﬀect of interest by doing so.
Proponents of interactive covariate-based extrapolation may object at this point that causally rel-
evant diﬀerences at the levels of parameters and basic structure of mechanisms pose no special
problem to their approach and can be handled if there are observable proxy variables that correlate
with these diﬀerences, so we can simply adjust for diﬀerences in the distributions of such proxy
variables.
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There are three reasons to be sceptical about this possibility. First, it is unclear whether diﬀerences
in parameters and the basic structure of causal mechanisms frequently have readily observable cor-
relates that are amenable to this strategy. Put simply, agents and populations do not typically wear
mechanism-types or parameter values on their sleeves. Second, features of causal mechanisms (and
diﬀerences in such features) that are important for extrapolation often do not readily manifest them-
selves in ways other than in agents’ behavioral response to the speciﬁc intervention of interest; think
for instance about latent psychological characteristics. So while there could be proxy variables that
correlate with important parameters and features of mechanisms, measurements of such variables
would often only be useful after the intervention of interest was already experienced by agents,
thus again raising concerns about the extrapolator’s circle. Third, even if many causally relevant diﬀer-
ences in parameters and the basic structure of mechanisms had readily observable proxies to permit
interactive-covariate-based reweighting, measuring and accommodating diﬀerences in such vari-
ables would still require extensive causal knowledge about both populations, including details con-
cerning how proxy variables are associated with the underlying diﬀerences in parameters and basic
causal structure and whether this association is the same in both populations. This suggests that the
concerns developed here are not easily remedied by appealing to the principled possibility of adjust-
ing for diﬀerences in proxy variables; at least not without substantive assumptions and raising
additional concerns about the extrapolator’s circle.
The upshot is this: interactive covariate-based extrapolation proceeds on the assumptions that
experimental and target populations are relevantly similar at the level of the basic structure of
causal mechanisms as well as the parameters associated with the interactive covariates by which
adjustment proceeds. Validating these assumptions, however, will not only often be diﬃcult, but is
also likely to fall prey to the extrapolator’s circle.
This suggests the need for a supplementary strategy to underwrite interactive covariate-based
extrapolation; one that evades the extrapolator’s circle. At least one such strategy has been proposed
by Steel (2008). Let me brieﬂy outline Steel’s proposal before I proceed to argue that, although prom-
ising, it will not help EBP researchers and econometricians evade the extrapolator’s circle in the kinds
of cases they routinely encounter, and given their preference for using quantitative observational
data from the target to facilitate extrapolation.
4. Steel’s comparative process tracing
According to Steel (2008), a strategy called comparative process tracing (CPT) can help us extrapolate
causal relevance claims, e.g. whether X is causally relevant for Y in B if it is causally relevant in A, while
evading the extrapolator’s circle. In virtue of this, CPT could be a promising candidate to underwrite
interactive covariate-based extrapolation by helping us determine whether populations are similar at
the level of the basic structure of causal mechanisms.
Steel’s strategy proceeds in two steps. The ﬁrst is to learn the mechanism in the experimental
system by means of process tracing, i.e. specifying distinctive marks one would expect to be
present if, and preferably only if, a putative mechanism is operating, and determining empirically
whether these distinctive marks are present or absent, thus speaking for or against the putative
mechanism being operational (see e.g. Beach, 2017; Salmon, 1984, ch. 4).
The second step is to compare mechanisms in the experimental and target populations at so-
called downstream bottleneck stages, i.e. stages of the mechanism that are closest to the outcome
and through which any eﬀect of an intervention must be transmitted (Steel, 2008, p. 89).
To illustrate, Steel oﬀers the example of extrapolating the carcinogenicity of Aﬂatoxin B1 from
animals to humans. Here, the carcinogenicity of Aﬂatoxins (a class of spoilage mold metabolites),
including a particularly potent type called Aﬂatoxin B1 (AFB1), was experimentally established in
a variety of animal species. These carcinogenic eﬀects were also learnt to vary signiﬁcantly
between species as a function of between-species diﬀerences in metabolic mechanisms.
Together with quantitative observational evidence from human populations indicating
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signiﬁcantly higher incidence of hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) for humans that had been
exposed to AFB1, this raised the extrapolative query whether humans are similarly susceptible
to these eﬀects. Straightforward causal attribution of observed HCC to AFB1 exposure in
humans was precluded, however, since observed populations also exhibited high rates of Hepa-
titis B virus infection (HBV), a predominant cause of HCC in humans. Hence, an important step in
clarifying the carcinogenicity of AFB1 in humans was to investigate whether a similar metabolic
mechanism that governs the carcinogenicity of AFB1 in animals is also operating in humans. In
order to evade the extrapolator’s circle, these comparisons of mechanisms in animals and
humans needed to proceed without learning the full mechanism in humans. According to
Steel, CPT helped achieve this in the following way (but see Reiss, 2010 who questions
whether the extrapolator’s circle was indeed evaded):
Let C be exposure to AFB1, Y the cancer outcome, and X, A, Z, B, E the intermediate stages of the
mechanism involved in metabolizing AFB1 in animals:
C  X  A Z  B E  Y
Suppose the stages at which mechanisms between animals and humans are most likely to diﬀer
are Z and E, where E is a bottleneck through which any inﬂuence of AFB1 on the outcome is trans-
mitted. Then, to ensure that populations are similar with respect to mechanisms, it is suﬃcient to
compare mechanisms at E, a descendant of C and the nearest parent of Y . If mechanisms are
similar at this stage, in the sense that variation induced in C is transmitted up to E, then extrapol-
ation of causal relevance claims can proceed successfully even without full knowledge of the
mechanism in the target. The reasoning is that if experimental and target systems are relevantly
diﬀerent at any stage upstream of E and downstream of C, then variation induced in C will not
transmit up to E. Conversely, if variation induced in C does transmit up to E, then either the mech-
anisms are similar between C and E, or they are dissimilar but the dissimilarities are not relevant
since they do not curtail the transmission of variation from C to E.
Against this background, Steel’s extrapolation theorem says that using CPT to learn that
mechanisms in both populations are similar at downstream bottleneck stages helps us to suc-
cessfully extrapolate claims of causal relevance without falling prey to the extrapolator’s circle.
(Steel, 2008, p. 113).
At face value, this result could be useful for underwriting interactive covariate-based extrapolation
as it seems to oﬀer a way to evade the extrapolator’s circle at least when it comes to supporting that
experimental and target populations are similar at the level of mechanisms.
In what follows, I oﬀer reasons to think that CPT will not be useful for this purpose in the kinds
of cases that econometricians and EBP researchers typically encounter, and given their preference
for using quantitative observational evidence from the target to facilitate extrapolation. To help
delineate these cases, I develop a distinction between two kinds of extrapolation: attributive and
predictive.
5. The limits of comparative process tracing
The extrapolation Steel discusses in his AFB1 example is of a speciﬁc kind. This attributive extrapol-
ation aims to attribute an observed eﬀect causally to its suspected causes. The kind of extrapolation
typically encountered in EBP and econometrics is importantly diﬀerent. This predictive extrapolation
aims to predict the future eﬀects of (interventions on) suspected causes. This proceeds under con-
ditions where neither the intervention of interest nor its suspected eﬀects have yet been observed
in the target. This distinction is related to the familiar distinction between investigating the eﬀects
of causes and the causes of eﬀects. In the present case, we are interested however not in investi-
gating what the eﬀects of causes or causes of eﬀects are in a particular study setting, but rather
with reaching extrapolative conclusions about the causes of observed eﬀects, or about the eﬀects
of future interventions on suspected causes in a distinct target.
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In what follows I argue that problems of predictive extrapolation are unlikely to be overcome by
using a combination of CPT and quantitative observational evidence without falling prey to the extra-
polator’s circle.
To illustrate, let me invoke Steel’s AFB1 extrapolation case again. One distinctive feature of this
extrapolation is that it proceeded against the background of observational evidence on humans
where both the suspected cause of interest, AFB1 exposure, as well as its suspected eﬀect, HCC,
were jointly realized and observed. The primary aim of the extrapolation was not to answer
whether AFB1 is a cause of HCC in humans simpliciter, but rather whether AFB1, rather than HBV,
or in addition to HBV, was a cause of observed HCC in humans that had been exposed to AFB1. In
more general terms, the extrapolative query was whether X , rather than, or in addition to Z, is a
cause of observed eﬀects on Y in the target. I call this type of extrapolation attributive extrapolation.
This is importantly diﬀerent from predictive extrapolation, which is typically encountered in EBP
and econometrics contexts. Here, the point of departure is usually a causal eﬀect of an intervention
identiﬁed in an RCT or quasi-experimental study and the question is what the eﬀects of the same (or a
similar) intervention will be in a novel target. What is distinctive of these cases is that neither the inter-
vention on X nor its suspected eﬀects on the outcome Y have yet been observed in the target. The
reason is simply that most studies in EBP and econometrics investigate the eﬀects of novel interven-
tions, so it may usually be assumed that these interventions have never been historically experienced
in envisioned policy targets at the time of extrapolation. This means that the aim of extrapolation is
typically predictive rather than attributive: will yet unobserved interventions on X cause future, yet unob-
served eﬀects on Y in the target?
This diﬀerence between attributive and predictive extrapolation goes hand in hand with impor-
tant diﬀerences in the evidence that is available to support extrapolation. Steel’s aim is to highlight
the importance of process tracing evidence, i.e. observations of the presence or absence of distinctive
marks of a hypothesized mechanism.
It is important to recognize, however, that CPT in Steel’s case proceeded against the background
of several other kinds of supplementary evidence that established a basis for comparing mechanisms,
including (1) evidence that helped to characterize the mechanism of interest in animals, (2) evidence
indicating between-species variation in the eﬀect of interest that could present obstacles to extrapol-
ation from animals to humans, as well as (3) evidence concerning between-species diﬀerences in
mechanisms that induced these between-species diﬀerences in eﬀects.
As Steel recognizes, an immediate problem in many social science contexts is that such evidence is
diﬃcult to produce (2008, Ch. 8). Concerning (1), mechanisms governing the outcomes of interest are
often diﬃcult to observe even in the experimental population; think for instance about the psycho-
logical mechanisms involved in governing individuals’ economic choice behaviors. This is aggravated
by the extant emphasis in EBP and econometrics to focus on studying the eﬀects of causes rather
than (also) investigating the causal mechanisms governing these eﬀects, meaning that evidence
with bearing on questions of mechanistic similarity and diﬀerence is typically not considered relevant
(see e.g. Kern, Stuart, Hill, & Green, 2016), and only few attempts are made to produce such evidence
(see Cook, 2002; Deaton, 2009; Heckman & Smith, 1995 for related criticisms; but see Imai et al., 2013
for an exception). Concerning (2), observational evidence concerning diﬀerences in causal eﬀects is
somewhat easier to produce (see e.g. Athey & Imbens, 2016 for machine learning methods to detect
heterogeneous causal eﬀects). Yet, attributing such diﬀerences to underlying mechanistic diﬀerences
is again diﬃcult for lack of (3), i.e. evidence indicating which diﬀerences in mechanisms induce such
diﬀerences in eﬀects.
However, even if such evidence could be readily obtained from experimental populations, to
compare mechanisms we still need some evidence characterizing the mechanism in the target.
This is crucial. In contrast to the AFB1 example where experiments on components of the putative
mechanism in the target could be performed (e.g. on human cell cultures), in many contexts of inter-
est in EBP and econometrics similar means for observing mechanisms in the target are unavailable
(Steel, 2008, p. 166). Instead, the most salient way in which EBP researchers and econometricians
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could compare mechanisms in line with standard methodological tenets and evidential preferences
in these ﬁelds is by using quantitative observational data from the target. Such data could help deter-
mine whether distinctive marks of the suspected mechanism, e.g. in the form of distinctive covari-
ance and (conditional) probabilistic dependence/independence signatures between variables, are
realized there.8
In Steel’s example, such evidence is supplied by observational studies on humans. These studies
oﬀered covariance information suggesting that relative risk of HCC is signiﬁcantly higher in humans
that have been exposed to AFB1 and that this association remains stable even when conditioning on
HBV infection (IARC, 1993).
Such evidence is not available in predictive extrapolation cases. The crucial diﬀerence here is that
when neither the intervention of interest nor its suspected eﬀects have yet been observed in the
target, quantitative observational evidence cannot speak to questions about mechanistic similarity
and diﬀerence.
An example helps illustrate this. Suppose we learn that distributing free insecticide-treated bed
nets helps decrease Malaria infection rates in population A. Suppose further that bed nets must be
properly installed to curtail Malaria infection, and that whether nets are in fact properly installed
can diﬀer signiﬁcantly between populations, e.g. agents in some populations might use them as
ﬁshing nets instead (McLean et al., 2014). Let me represent this by the simplistic mechanism
X→Z→Y, where Z, the number of properly installed nets, is a mediating variable on the path from
distributed nets X to Malaria infection Y (where Z is negatively relevant for Y).
How can we make sure that this mechanism is suﬃciently similar between an experimental popu-
lation A and a novel target B where bed nets have not yet been distributed? Quantitative observa-
tional evidence that could help indicate that the mechanism in B is similar to that in A would be
that Z is higher conditional on X than unconditionally, indicating that distributed nets are properly
installed, and that Y is lower conditional on Z than unconditionally, suggesting that properly installed
nets in fact reduce Malaria infection.9
The crucial problem is that such information cannot be obtained from the target if no bed nets
have ever been distributed there. If that is the case then X and Z exhibit no variation, since X = 0,
and Z = 0 for all individuals, and Y will only assume its natural value that is induced through relevant
Malaria infection pathways.10 This means that Z conditional on X and Z unconditionally will be equal,
and that Y conditional on Z, and Y unconditionally will be equal as well. So if no bed nets have ever
been distributed in the target, there will be no (co-)variation in the outcomes of interest or the inter-
mediate stages of the mechanism that could help us tell whether mechanisms are suﬃciently similar.
More generally, in cases where the intervention of interest has never historically been experienced
and observed in the target, quantitative observational data on variables that ﬁgure in the suspected
mechanism are not informative about mechanistic similarities and diﬀerences between populations.
This means that if, as econometricians and EBP researchers do, we primarily consider quantitative
observational data from the target relevant for underwriting extrapolation, we cannot tell whether
the target exhibits characteristic signatures of the suspected mechanism being operational. As
Steel anticipates, ‘[…] the operation of a program can be examined only where it is implemented
[…]’ (2008, p. 166). So while this problem can be remedied by intervening on X in the target,
doing so would trivially fall prey to the extrapolator’s circle.
To be sure, one could argue that quantitative observational evidence from the target can still have
indirect bearing on questions of mechanistic similarity and diﬀerence if there have been similar, and
well-understood interventions (or exogenous changes) in the target in the past.11 This seems poss-
ible, but would also seem to require substantive assumptions concerning how such past interven-
tions (or exogenous changes) relate to those of current interest, e.g. whether their eﬀects are
governed by the same mechanisms and in the same way, as well as whether the intervention of
current interest is structure-altering or not. Such assumptions are not recognizably weaker than,
and similarly diﬃcult to support as those at issue here.
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The concerns outlined above are not surprising. Quantitative observational data only have
bearing on questions concerning features of causal mechanisms if there is suﬃcient variation in
at least some of the putatively causally relevant variables. More generally, we might say that quan-
titative observational evidence can only be informative about the causal mechanisms governing
observable phenomena if these phenomena have already obtained in some way or another,
and have consequently had the opportunity to write, as it were, distinctive marks, symptoms, sig-
natures etc. into the data that we can obtain. Without such opportunity, quantitative observational
evidence from the target remains a poor guide to clarifying issues of mechanistic similarity and
diﬀerence.
6. Predictive extrapolation: where next?
The previous discussion suggests three things. First, interactive covariate-based strategies for extra-
polation involve wide-ranging but ultimately unsubstantiated assumptions that populations are
suﬃciently similar at the level of mechanisms and parameters relevant to the eﬀects of interest.
Second, empirically validating these assumptions raises concerns about the extrapolator’s circle.
Third, even Steel’s CPT is not immune to these concerns: at least in predictive extrapolation cases,
quantitative observational data from the target are of little help in clarifying issues of mechanistic
similarity and diﬀerence. So even if econometricians and EBP researchers were to use CPT, they
could not rely on quantitative observational data from the target.
This is not to suggest that interactive covariate-based strategies are fundamentally ﬂawed. It is
practically diﬃcult, but perhaps not insurmountably so, to support that populations are relevantly
similar at the level of mechanisms and parameters. Similarly, my aim is not to suggest that CPT is
an inadequate strategy for extrapolation in general. I consider CPT to be a promising strategy; but
my concern is that predictive extrapolation poses distinct challenges for CPT, speciﬁcally that quan-
titative observational data from the target are not useful for CPT in such cases. So if preferences for
such evidence are maintained, it seems that interactive covariate-based extrapolation cannot be
underwritten by CPT, and if applied at all, would need to proceed on hope that populations are
suﬃciently similar rather than evidence that this is so.
I now want to consider some suggestions for what might be done about this. Since the primary
aims of this paper are critical in nature, I will not attempt to develop an alternative strategy for under-
writing extrapolation here. However, it seems useful brieﬂy to consider some ways to respond to the
challenges put forward; speciﬁcally proposals oﬀered in EBP-related literatures that are not married to
preferences for quantitative data.
There is a rich literature on supporting process tracing, including for purposes of extrapolation, by
qualitative social scientiﬁc evidence, e.g. sociological, anthropological, and ethnographic evidence
obtained from sources such as interview studies, participatory observation, and expert judgment
(see e.g. Blatter & Blume, 2008; Kay & Baker, 2015; Schmitt & Beach, 2015; see Fairﬁeld & Charman,
2017 for a Bayesian approach to integrating diﬀerent kinds of qualitative evidence). Econometricians
and EBP researchers have so far been reluctant to consider such evidence (see Kern et al., 2016).
However, the arguments provided here suggest that this reluctance is misguided, and that produ-
cing, using, and integrating other kinds of evidence, including qualitative evidence, may be useful,
and in some cases perhaps even necessary, for underwriting extrapolation beyond the level of
mere hope that crucial assumptions are satisﬁed.
Let me draw on the bed net example again to illustrate how this could proceed. For instance, ana-
logously to in-vitro studies on human cell cultures that helped pin down speciﬁc features of parts of
the suspected mechanism in humans in Steel’s AFB1 example, it might be possible to investigate
whether the insecticidal eﬀects of the bed nets to be distributed in the target do in fact obtain on
Mosquitos sampled from the target; at least qualitatively. So for some parts of the suspected mech-
anisms in the target, it may be relatively straightforward to isolate and study parts of it (or well-under-
stood analogues of it), without (1) having to rely on quantitative observational data from the target
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(such as observing that infection rates are lower conditionally on properly installed nets than uncon-
ditionally) or (2) introducing bed nets in the target and triggering the extrapolator’s circle.12
For other causal relations this may be more challenging. For instance, it seems that investigating
whether agents in the target will properly install bed nets can again raise concerns about the extra-
polator’s circle, e.g. when we introduce bed nets provisionally in (at least part of) the target. Propo-
nents of qualitative approaches to EBP might suggest that this could be avoided by considering
sources of evidence such as participatory observation, agents’ self-reports, or expert judgment. For
instance, they might point out that agents can sometimes reliably report on counterfactual states
of aﬀairs that have bearing on questions of mechanistic similarity and diﬀerence; e.g. when these
counterfactual states are importantly determined by agents’ own decision-making (see e.g.
Fairﬁeld & Charman, 2017; Kay & Baker, 2015; for such suggestions). If, for instance, agents do in
fact have alternative uses for bed nets, such as using them as ﬁshing nets, then it seems that they
could, under some conditions, reliably report that, if they were given free bed nets, they would
not use them as bed nets but rather as ﬁshing nets. Similarly, agents may also be able to report
on counterfactual states of aﬀairs that hinge on other agents’ decision making, or on existing
social norms, where agents, as well as experts with local knowledge of the target, might be able
to anticipate, at least qualitatively, how these norms may interact with the intervention of interest
(see Cartwright & Hardie, 2012 for related suggestions).13
Of course, considering qualitative evidence also raises a host of new challenges. Agents may be
overconﬁdent about their propensity to adhere to implementation protocols; they may experience
substantial diﬃculties in anticipating the eﬀects of some interventions, such as predicting the
eﬀect of deworming on student achievement; they may be incentivized to strategically misreport
their expected future behaviors, and so on.
More generally, agents’ self-reports are often plausibly suspected to be unreliable, and various
important precautions need to be undertaken to support the reliability of such evidence, e.g. trian-
gulating qualitative conclusions by considering multiple sources and using diﬀerent elicitation
methods, having agents report on others’ behaviors instead of their own, ensuring that agents are
not improperly incentivized to strategically misreport, etc. (see Schmitt & Beach, 2015 for practical
examples concerning the importance of such precautions).
What is more, it is not to be expected that qualitative evidence of the kind outlined above will
be suﬃciently informative by itself to tell us how much exactly, for instance, a particular eﬀect will
be ampliﬁed or diminished by local causal features of the target. However, it is important to recog-
nize that this does not preclude quantitative predictions of causal eﬀects in the target. If qualitative
evidence increases our conﬁdence that crucial features of causal mechanisms are qualitatively
similar between populations, e.g. that a moderating variable W is likely to interact with an inter-
vention in the same qualitative way in both populations, this can oﬀer important support (although
perhaps not full-ﬂedged warrant) for the assumptions that are necessary for interactive covariate-
based extrapolation to proceed. If this is successful, interactive covariate-based strategies may jus-
tiﬁably be used to obtain quantitative predictions of causal eﬀects, just as envisioned by their
proponents.
So qualitative evidence is not a silver bullet to address the shortcomings of interactive covariate-
based strategies. However, when quantitative data from the target are unlikely to help clarify whether
populations are suﬃciently similar to license extrapolation at all, considering qualitative evidence
with bearing on these issues, despite its potential shortcomings and the additional methodological
burden placed on us, may still be recognizably superior to proceeding on mere hope that populations
are suﬃciently similar.
Most importantly, considering qualitative evidence promises to help us evade the extrapolator’s
circle. Here, the intervention is not introduced in the target, but only hypothetically in the minds
of agents who may possess relevant expertise to report on features of causal mechanisms and pro-
cesses that they are part of, and that have important bearing on the eﬀects of interest. This would
steer clear of the extrapolator’s circle because while agents’ self-reports may help us rule out
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important causally relevant diﬀerences between populations, the casual eﬀects of interest could
probably not be learned by asking them any number of questions. So qualitative evidence can be
useful for clarifying issues of similarity and diﬀerence between populations, but is not a suﬃcient
means to predict causal eﬀects in the target.
So what is the main suggestion for how extrapolation in econometrics and EBP should proceed in
light of the arguments provided here? It seems clear that predictive extrapolation (which is predomi-
nant in econometrics and EBP) poses distinct challenges for interactive covariate-based strategies (as
well as for CPT). While there is no obvious remedy, it seems that considering qualitative evidence with
bearing on questions of similarity and diﬀerence between populations is an option that should be
explored in more detail, as such evidence might be able to give us at least some purchase on
whether the assumptions required for interactive-covariate-based extrapolation are satisﬁed.
In light of this, it seems reasonable to suggest that the ability of qualitative evidence to speak to these
issues should be investigated further, and that the production and use of such evidence should be
encouraged inwidely circulatedmethodological guidelines such as those issuedby theCampbell Collab-
oration, theWhatWorks Clearinghouse, CONSORT, GRADE, J-PAL and others. In addition, more attempts
should be made to develop strategies for integrating quantitative and qualitative evidence in domain-
general theories (sometimes called program theories, theories of change, or logic frames) that aim to
oﬀer comprehensive accounts of how the interventions of interest achieve their intended eﬀects, and
under what conditions they might fail to do so (see e.g. Davey et al., 2017 for similar suggestions).
Some EBP institutions such as J-PAL, 3ie and others already make attempts along these lines (White,
2009). These are only early steps however, and a persuasive, general methodology for underpinning
extrapolation by means of integrating qualitative and quantitative evidence is still missing.
As the arguments provided here suggest, there is much promise in developing such a method-
ology. It seems that there can be cases where qualitative and quantitative evidence, when considered
in tandem, can help us extrapolate causal eﬀects in a way that is superior to doing so based on either
type of evidence alone. Qualitative evidence by itself can at best clarify issues of qualitative causal
relevance. Quantitative evidence by itself, on the other hand, can help us make extrapolative predic-
tions of causal eﬀect magnitudes in the target, but these predictions are only credible if crucial
assumptions about similarities between populations are empirically supported. At least in predictive
extrapolation it is clear that this role cannot be played by quantitative observational evidence from
the target. But as the arguments provided here suggest, qualitative and quantitative evidence can
play complementary roles: one helps clarify whether populations are similar at the level of basic
causal structure, the other helps investigate causal eﬀect magnitudes of interventions implemented
in one setting, and with adjusting for diﬀerences in the distributions of variables that can modify
these eﬀects. Considered together, both types of evidence can hence underwrite extrapolative con-
clusions that would not be accessible from either type of evidence alone.
Providing the details of a methodology for integrating qualitative and quantitative evidence is
beyond the scope of this paper, but I hope that the arguments provided here will reinforce similar
suggestions made by other philosophers (e.g. Cartwright, 2013; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Grüne-
Yanoﬀ, 2016) by providing reasons to think that extrapolation may not only be greatly facilitated
by considering qualitative evidence pertaining to the causal mechanisms governing the eﬀects to
be extrapolated, but that a wide range of real-world extrapolations may be exceedingly diﬃcult to
underwrite without doing so. This, I hope, will help motivate further contributions that encourage
econometricians and EBP researchers to add previously neglected kinds of evidence to their arsenals
in the pursuit of underwriting extrapolation by more than hope alone.
Notes
1. For the present purposes I understand the distinction between observational and experimental in the standard
sense that observational approaches are passive and that experimental approaches either involve intervention by
the investigator, or exploit variation in the treatment variable that is justiﬁably believed to be exogenous.
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2. By mechanism I mean a set of causal relationships (or representation thereof) between variables that underpin
and govern observable phenomena, such as transmitting the eﬀects of interventions on one variable to
another. I do not wish to make more precise commitments, as they would detract from the generality of my
arguments.
3. One might argue that we can represent the absence of causal relations between X and Y already at the
second level, e.g. by setting the parameter for such relations zero. While this is possible, I prefer to keep
two issues distinct: quantitative issues concerning the signs and magnitudes of marginal causal eﬀects
should be represented at the level of parameters, whereas qualitative issues concerning the presence,
absence, and direction of causal relations should be represented at the level of the basic structure of the
mechanisms. More generally, the three levels distinguished here are mostly of pragmatic value and do
not constitute a substantive commitment that they are genuinely distinct levels of causal analysis, nor
that it is ever straightforward to classify features that induce causally relevant diﬀerences as features that
obtain at either one of the levels but not others.
4. A more nuanced, gradual version of this concern would be that the information from the experiment is almost
redundant to the extrapolation, e.g. when even major variations in experimental results would have negligible
impact on our quantitative predictions of the eﬀect in the target.
5. For the present purposes I focus on non-structural microeconometrics, speciﬁcally the so-called treatment-
eﬀects literature, which is concerned with estimating and extrapolating causal eﬀects from experimental
and quasi-experimental data. For detailed examinations of the diﬀerences between, and history of, struc-
tural and non-structural, reduced-form approaches see Boumans (2005); for a critical discussion see
Keane (2010).
6. One might argue that rather than the parameter associated with W being positive in A but negative in
B, what happens here is rather that W is associated with the outcome in B via an additional causal
pathway that is mediated by stigmatization, which is negatively relevant for performance. I am open to
alternative characterizations, as not much hinges on this. The point is merely that we need to ensure
that there are no diﬀerences in whether (causal structure) and how (parameters) W is involved in producing
Y; otherwise, adjusting for diﬀerences in the value/distribution of W will not help us predict the correct
casual quantity in B.
7. The equations simply encode the causal assumptions elaborated here and represent that Y is causally determined
in accordance with the equations. Indices are suppressed for simplicity, which means that we assume individuals
within A and B respectively to be perfectly alike. Importantly, the particular functional form here, where the term
involvingW is additively separable, is only assumed for ease of illustration. The problem highlighted persists in the
more general case where Y ⇐ f (g, W , X , v). So long as f (·) involves some interaction between X andW, where the
marginal eﬀect of W is not separable from X, we need to ensure that the functional form of f (·) and the value of g
are the same between populations.
8. This seems coherent with how extrapolation is supposed to proceed according to Hotz et al. (2005). Recall that, on
their approach, the evidence from the target used to facilitate extrapolation is quantitative observational evi-
dence concerning the distributions of putatively relevant variables that may induce diﬀerences in causal
eﬀects. Exemplary applications such as Dehejia, Pop-Eleches, and Samii (2015) and Gechter (2016) suggest
that econometricians and EBP researchers would also be inclined to rely on quantitative observational data
from the target to support that experimental and target populations are relevantly similar at the levels of par-
ameters and mechanisms.
9. This is called pattern evidence on Beach and Pedersen’s (2016) typology of process tracing evidence.
10. In the macroeconometrics literature, this is known as the problem of non-excitation (cf. Salmon & Wallis, 1982;
Engle, Hendry, & Richard, 1983).
11. Steel anticipates this general intuition when discussing concerns surrounding structure-altering interventions
(2008, pp. 157–160). I thank Wendy Parker for calling my attention to this.
12. I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for suggesting this example.
13. This is not dramatically diﬀerent from what Steel’s CPT recommends. The arguments presented here add an
important nuance, however, which is that in predictive extrapolation, for lack of observational evidence indicating
that there is some causal pathway from the intervention variable to the outcome of interest, CPT may need to be
supported with more evidence that has bearing on questions of mechanistic similarity. When available evidence
from the target is insuﬃcient to clarify these questions, this may, again, make it likely that we fall prey to the extra-
polator’s circle. At least in these cases, the attributive/predictive extrapolation distinction has important ramiﬁca-
tions for CPT: it can evade the extrapolator’s circle in many, but perhaps not in all cases.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank two anonymous referees of this journal, as well as Julian Reiss, Nancy Cartwright, Wendy Parker, and
members of the CHESS and K4U research groups at Durham University for their many valuable comments and
56 D. KHOSROWI
suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Moreover, I would like to thank the audiences at INEM2017 and EPSA2017
for raising several important points that helped improve the arguments developed here. My work on this paper was
ﬁnancially supported by an AHRC Northern Bridge Doctoral Studentship (grant number: AH/L503927/1), a Durham Doc-
toral Studentship, and a Royal Institute of Philosophy Jacobsen Studentship. I am very grateful for this support.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Donal Khosrowi is currently a doctoral candidate in Philosophy at the Centre for Humanities Engaging Science and
Society at Durham University. His doctoral research focuses on strategies for extrapolating causal eﬀects. His broader
research interests and recent publications are concerned with causal inference in social science, scientiﬁc representation,
and values in science.
ORCID
Donal Khosrowi http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9927-2000
References
Athey, S., & Imbens, G. W. (2016). Recursive partitioning for heterogeneous causal eﬀects. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 113(27), 7353–7360.
Beach, D. (2017). Process-tracing methods in social science.Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Retrieved from http://
politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-176
Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2016). Causal case studies: Foundations and guidelines for comparing, matching and tracing.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Blatter, J., & Blume, T. (2008). In Search of co-variance, causal mechanisms or congruence? Towards a plural understand-
ing of case studies. Swiss Political Science Review, 14(2), 315–356.
Boumans, M. J. (2005). How economists model the world into numbers. London: Routledge.
Cartwright, N. D. (2012). Presidential address: Will this policy work for you? Predicting eﬀectiveness better: How philos-
ophy helps. Philosophy of Science, 79(5), 973–989.
Cartwright, N. D. (2013). Evidence, argument and prediction. In EPSA11 perspectives and foundational problems in philos-
ophy of science, the European philosophy of science association proceedings 2. Basel: Springer.
Cartwright, N. D., & Hardie, J. (2012). Evidence-based policy: A practical guide to doing it better. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Cook, T. D. (2002). Randomized experiments in educational policy research: A critical examination of the reasons the edu-
cational evaluation community has oﬀered for not doing them. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 24, 175–199.
Crump, R. K., Hotz, V. J., Imbens, G. W., & Mitnik, O. A. (2008). Nonparametric tests for treatment eﬀect heterogeneity.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 389–405.
Davey, C., Hassan, S., Bonell, C., Cartwright, N., Humphreys, M., Prost, A., & Hargreaves, J. (2017). Gaps in evaluation
methods for addressing challenging contexts in development (CEDIL PreInception paper). London.
Deaton, A. (2009). Instruments of development: Randomization in the tropics, and the search for the elusive keys to econ-
omic development. Proceedings of the British Academy, 2008 Lectures, 162, 123–160.
Deaton, A., & Cartwright, N. (2016). Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials (Technical report).
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dehejia, R., Pop-Eleches, C., & Samii, C. (2015). Local to global: External validity in a fertility natural experiment. SSRN
Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2647649
Engle, R. F., Hendry, D. F., & Richard, J.-F. (1983). Exogeneity. Econometrica, 51(2), 277–304.
Fairﬁeld, T., & Charman, A. (2017). Explicit Bayesian analysis for process tracing: Guidelines, opportunities, and caveats.
Political Analysis. ISSN 1047-1987.
Gechter, M. (2016). Generalizing the results from social experiments: Theory and evidence from Mexico and India
(Unpublished manuscript). Pennsylvania State University.
Grüne-Yanoﬀ, T. (2016). Why behavioral policy needs mechanistic evidence. Economics and Philosophy, 32(3), 463–483.
Heckman, J. J., & Smith, J. A. (1995). Assessing the case for social experiments. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 85–110.
Hotz, V. J., Imbens, G. W., & Mortimer, J. H. (2005). Predicting the eﬃcacy of future training programs using past experi-
ences at other locations. Journal of Econometrics, 125, 241–270.
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 57
Imai, K., Tingley, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2013). Experimental designs for identifying causal mechanisms. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 176, 5–51.
International Agency for Research on Cancer. (IARC). (1993). Some naturally occurring substances: Food items and con-
stituents, heterocyclic aromatic amines and mycotoxins. IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to
Humans, Vol. 56. Lyon.
Kay, A., & Baker, P. (2015). What can causal process tracing oﬀer to policy studies? A review of the literature. Policy Studies
Journal, 43(1), 1–21.
Keane, M. P. (2010). Structural vs. atheoretic approaches to econometrics. Journal of Econometrics, 156, 3–20.
Kern, H. L., Stuart, E. A., Hill, J., & Green, D. P. (2016). Assessing methods for generalizing experimental impact estimates to
target populations. Journal of Research on Educational Eﬀectiveness, 9(1), 103–127.
LaFollette, H., & Shanks, N. (1996). Brute science: Dilemmas of animal experimentation. New York: Routledge.
McLean, K. A., Byanaku, A., Kubikonse, A., Tshowe, V., Katensi, S., & Lehman, A. G. (2014). Fishing with bed nets on Lake
Tanganyika: A randomized survey. Malaria Journal, 13, 395. doi:10.1186/1475-2875-13-395
Muller, S. M. (2014). Randomised trials for policy: A review of the external validity of treatment eﬀects (Southern Africa labour
and development research unit working paper 127). University of Cape Town.
Muller, S. M. (2015). Causal interaction and external validity: Obstacles to the policy relevance of randomized evaluations.
The World Bank Economic Review, 29(1), S217–S225.
Pearl, J. (2014). Reply to commentary by Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto concerning causal mediation analysis.
Psychological Methods, 19(4), 488–492.
Reiss, J. (2010). Review: Across the boundaries: Extrapolation in biology and social science. Economics and Philosophy, 26,
382–390.
Salmon, W. (1984). Scientiﬁc explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Salmon, M., & Wallis, K. F. (1982). Model validation and forecast comparisons: Theoretical and practical considerations. In
G. C. Chow & P. Corsi (Eds.), Evaluating the reliability of macroeconomic models (pp. 219–249). New York: John Wiley.
Chap. 12.
Schmitt, J., & Beach, D. (2015). The contribution of process tracing to theory-based evaluations of complex aid instru-
ments. Evaluation, 21(4), 429–447.
Steel, D. (2008). Across the boundaries: Extrapolation in biology and social science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
White, H. (2009). Theory–based impact evaluation: Principles andpractice. Journal ofDevelopment Eﬀectiveness, 1(3), 271–284.
58 D. KHOSROWI
